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Hakan Mehmetcik
Turkey’s interest in nuclear technology has increased over the years. The aim of 
this article is to summarize, synthetize, update, and contextualize Turkey’s non-
proliferation policies and link it to the broader discussion on nuclear latency. The 
article first attempts to show the shortcomings of several latency arguments by 
overviewing the factors that affect Turkey’s latency status. The main finding of the 
article is that Turkey’s latency in terms of technology will increase, yet that increase 
cannot be predicted as potent enough to result in latency potential in terms of a 
nuclear weapons program in the short- and medium-term without a serious change 
in international and domestic politics.
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Introduction
The central subject of this article is the latency issue with regard to the Turkish 
case. Turkey is often listed as a highly possible proliferator within the community 
of nuclear experts (Varnum 2010). Parallel to this, there are numerous studies 
predicting how and under which conditions Turkey may pursue nuclear weapons 
(ibid.; Güney 2012; Ulgen 2012; Stein 2015). Yet, almost no one has focused on 
the issue of latency in the Turkish context despite growing interest in the nuclear 
related technology of the country. 
States access to technology, materials, and expertise have increased over the 
previous decades thanks to technology and scientific diffusion and globalization 
(Pilat 2015). “What was once exotic is now pedestrian, and nuclear weapons are 
no exception” (Kemp 2014). Therefore, proliferation of nuclear related technology 
is now one of several stresses for the non-proliferation regime. The concern 
of latent proliferation capability is far larger than actual nuclear proliferation 
even though there is much less attention to this issue in the literature. Latency 
is generally associated with indigenous and industrial scale civilian nuclear 
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technology (Bunn 2001; Bluth et al. 2010; Yim and Li 2013). Indeed, the line 
between horizontal and latent proliferation is sometimes difficult to draw 
because all steps of a civilian nuclear energy industry are somehow identical 
with a military nuclear weapon program. Yet, the borderline between civilian 
and military use of nuclear energy clearly exists and case-by-case analyses taking 
into account of the nature of the nuclear program and motivations need to be 
made. After all, the existing studies show an insignificant correlation between the 
spread of the civilian use of the nuclear technology and actual nuclear weapon 
proliferation (Miller 2017).
As a matter of fact, it is very unlikely that Turkey would voluntarily damage 
its clean proliferation record and its relations with the rest of the world by 
pursuing an opaque/open/secret nuclear weapon program. Yet, latency, as a 
means of technological hedging against future security risks, could be a path 
Turkey would (if it ever does) prefer and Turkish nuclear diplomacy implies a 
latency preference. This article has employed a descriptive analysis based on open 
source materials to tackle the Turkish case by asking three important questions: 
how latent is Turkey? How latent could Turkey be in the short- and long-term? 
And what are the latency motivations for Turkey?  First, a discussion on the issue 
of latency and some difficulties in the definition is provided. Then the article 
addresses Turkish latency in the short- and long-term by analyzing Turkish 
nuclear ambitions, and lastly tackles Turkish latency motivations.  
Nuclear Latency Hazard: Defining a Latent Nuclear Power
Theoretically, states follow four strategies of nuclear pursuit: hedging, sprinting, 
hiding, and sheltering (Narang 2017). Latency is not one of them, yet it is an 
integral part of almost every strategy. Hedging is the closest variant as it is 
difficult to demarcate hedging and latency on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds. Hedging generally involves work on nuclear explosives, fissile materials, 
weapon designs, delivery systems, as well as bureaucratic capacities to manage 
nuclear capabilities, while nuclear latency generally refers to virtual proliferation 
as having weapon-grade nuclear material and technology in a civilian nuclear 
program without having made the decision to actually assemble and deploy a 
bomb (Mazarr 1997; Pilat 1997). That is, a latent proliferator stays within “the 
civilian context” without any meaningful nuclear weapon endeavors. Japan 
is one often-noted example, and latency is even sometimes called the “Japan 
Model” (Fitzpatrick 2014, 2016a). Latency is also called technical hedging. From 
a technical point of view, virtually any industrialized nation today has nuclear 
latency in one way or another. Yet, it is neither apt nor empirically correct to 
focus on only the material and technical capabilities to reach a theoretically rich 
and widely applicable definition of latency over a number of cases. Thus, it is 
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arguably true that there is no settled definition of the term and no agreement 
among experts for an authoritative answer to the number of states having nuclear 
latency. Some suggest the figure is as high as sixty-nine (Barnaby 1992) while 
others put it around forty (Hymans 2006), thirty-four (Meyer 1984), and thirty-
one (Fuhrmann and Tkach 2015) using different metrics and analysis. Yet, the 
nuclear latency question, as Sagan (2010, 80) underlined, is still understudied and 
poorly understood among experts, diplomats, scholars, and journalist.
Defining a nuclear state is still a futile exercise even though it is one of the 
most studied social science topics, let alone defining nuclear latency. However, it 
is purposeful to start with the nuclear weapon production process, which can be 
divided into two major steps. The first is the producing fissile material, which is 
enriched uranium or reprocessed plutonium. The second is actual bomb design, 
manufacturing, and testing. The former is known as the toughest and most time 
consuming part of a nuclear weapon program while the latter is relatively easier 
in the current environment than it was several decades ago (Zimmerman 1994). 
Any latent power should able to overcome the first step, which significantly 
shortens the time for reaching the nuclear weapon option. Thus, it is hard to 
separate the latency discussion from the proliferation discussion simply because 
the differences between civilian use of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons 
is rather a theoretical one. However, the proliferation of nuclear latency is 
distinct from weapons proliferation when these technologies have been used 
for indigenous civilian nuclear capacity and under strict international control. 
Furthermore, if a country would like to pursue a path towards nuclear weapons, 
it would choose opaque or secret proliferation, which will lower the chances of 
detection, instead of open and attention-grabbing civilian activities under Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) safeguards. According to 
Kemp’s (2014) analysis, the probability of timely detection is almost zero, should 
a state opt for building centrifuge capacity indigenously. Given that centrifuge 
technology is old and technically reachable for almost any state, and that there 
are many other options as well if a state would like to produce nuclear weapon, 
transforming a civilian nuclear program into a weapon program would not 
be ideal. Therefore, a civilian nuclear program rarely leads to actual nuclear 
proliferation (Miller 2017). Yet, latency substantially increases a countries 
technological imperatives towards the bomb.1 Thus, the risk of proliferation from 
latency profoundly depends on political motivations, and therefore it is case-
specific in nature. 
Yet, many studies significantly focus on the technical aspects without 
looking at political intent to define latency and try to provide answers for exactly 
how many countries are latent powers. For instance, in his 1984 study, Meyer 
found that thirty-four states held latent capability to build nuclear weapons. Later, 
Meyer’s study was updated by Richard Stoll (1996) to include developments up 
to 1992.  Based on this updated data (and methodology),2 Stoll argued that forty-
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eight countries had latent nuclear weapons capability in 1992. North-Korea, 
lacking the necessary nitric acid production capability, chemical engineers, and 
electronic/explosives specialists as measured by domestic automobile and radio/
television industries, was not among the listed latent nuclear powers at that 
time. Another well-known indicator set was developed by Jo and Garzke (2007) 
by droping three of Stoll’s (and Meyer’s) indicators (construction workforce, 
steel production, and previous mining activity) and adding necessary uranium 
deposits to the list. Even Jo and Gartzke’s data set for 2001 showed that North 
Korea, which would go on to conduct its first nuclear weapon test in 2006, was 
not a latent nuclear power, lacking sufficient chemical engineers, nitric acid 
production capability, and explosives specialists. Even South Africa, which built 
six nuclear weapons in the 1980s, dismantled the weapons in the 1990s, but 
still maintained from 450 to 600 kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) under 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard inspections in 2002, 
was coded as a country that lacked the full capability to build nuclear weapons 
due to lack of sufficient chemical engineers and nitric acid production capacity 
(Sagan 2010, 88). Similarly, Colombia, Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela had the 
highest rank in Jo and Gartzke’s eight-point composite indicator of latency even 
though none of these countries had constructed advanced nuclear facilities, 
nor the human capital or capacity to produce fissile materials (Fuhrmann and 
Tkach 2015). By pointing out these bizarre results, Sagan (2010, 81) suggests that 
these studies use “misleading measures of the key variables involved in nuclear 
technology, focusing on broad measures of industrial capability and nuclear 
research reactor experience and not on the specific fuel cycle technologies and 
facilities needed to make the fissile materials required for a nuclear weapon.” 
Taking note of Sagan’s suggestion, Furhmann and Tkach (2015) introduce a new 
dataset focusing on the development of enrichment and reprocessing facilities 
covering related data from 1939 to 2012. This new data sets indicates thirty-one 
countries as latent nuclear powers. 
However, none of these studies can define which countries are a proliferation 
risk due to its latent capacity using different metrics and definitions and have 
produced different and often inconclusive results. Therefore, by focusing on the 
material and technical aspects of the story, the literature often falls into a trap of 
misperception and misinterpretation. Studying latency is important but difficult. 
It requires both technical expertise on the nuclear fuel cycle and advanced 
political science knowledge about a particular country.3 
Overall, a working definition of latency for studying the Turkish case 
should consist of at least two aspects: (1) technical expertise including industrial 
scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities; (2) political conditions in which 
the latency option is wittingly presumed and even striven towards with several 
decision leading to that end.  Thus, should the existing civilian nuclear facilities, 
all of which are under construction, have provided Turkey with the requiste 
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technical expertise and capacities, and should Turkey’s internal and political 
environment have been altered to a degree that pushes the country’s leaders to 
make such a decision, then we could empirically argue that Turkey is a latent 
nuclear power. These technical and political conditions have to be analyzed to 
uncover the question of latency with regard to Turkey. 
The Turkish Case: How Latent Is It?
Turkey has been listed as a latent power under the indicators produced by both 
Meyer/Stoll as well as Jo and Gartzke. It is also one of the forty-six members of 
the Nuclear Supplier Group; even though it is not a nuclear power state, Turkey’s 
membership was requested due to its manufacturing capacity for materials 
of potential use in the nuclear industry.4 That is, Turkey has been recognized 
a (potential) latent nuclear power by some scholars and experts who mainly 
focus on the technical part of the latency metrics. Yet, Turkey does not possess 
the capability of constructing an industrial scale nuclear reactor to produce 
plutonium or the capability to produce enriched uranium. On this ground, 
Furhmann and Tkach (2015) do not count Turkey as a latent power in their 
latency list. From a purely technical point of view, Turkey has relatively advanced 
nuclear infrastructure as well as human capital due to its long interest in the 
nuclear technology (Acton and Bowen 2010, 444), yet it is far from being a latent 
nuclear power. 
Turkey’s interests in civilian nuclear technology dates back to the 1950s. It 
was among the first countries to sign an Atoms for Peace Agreement with the 
United States in June 1955. In 1956, Turkey founded the Turkish Atomic Energy 
(TAEK), under which it started to conduct very small nuclear fuel cycle research 
at the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center, where one small research 
reactor, the TR-2 5MWt reactor, had been established. Over the years, Turkey 
tried and failed many times to build large industrial scale nuclear power reactors. 
However, due to a variety of political and financial reasons, especially because 
of the lack of political and financial stability, Turkey never moved beyond the 
research and development stages even though there were significant steps taken 
towards building nuclear power plants. During that time there was alleged close 
links between Pakistani and Turkish high-level authorities.  That caused fear 
in some of the Western countries ove the illicit spread of nuclear technology. 
These alleged Pakistani connections were restricted and Turkey’s initiatives 
were rebuffed (Kibaroglu 1997). Turkey still does not have a nuclear reactor or 
industrial scale enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, which is not a sufficient 
but a necessary part of nuclear latency in terms of technical capabilities (Varnum 
2013). Nevertheless, given its contracted nuclear facilities and long running 
interest in nuclear technology, Turkey could have the necessary technical capacity 
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in the near future. In this sense, rather than Turkey’s current status, the risk 
of Turkey becoming a latent nuclear power in the future should be rigorously 
discussed. 
Turkey’s Latency Motivations
Given its good relations with neighboring states, belief in alliances with the West 
and international regimes, desire for European Union (EU) membership, and 
preference for obtaining international prestige through diplomatic leadership, 
Turkey faced no serious proliferation pressures until 2010. However, Turkey’s 
international and domestic politics have changed quickly, and the context of 
many of these constraints have transformed. Once predicted circumstances that 
could possibly push Turkey to consider the nuclear option have become realities 
in recent years (Fuerth 2004, 146). Yet, Turkey is still a good member of the 
nonproliferation regime by being part of almost every non-proliferation initiative 
and abiding by its non-proliferation commitments under these initiatives. 
Therefore, it is not easy to catalog all the motivations and predict their effects 
precisely. Yet, there are at least three types of motivations towards latency with 
regard to Turkish case, as seen in Table 1, which can be argued to be pushing 
Turkey’s nuclear calculations.
Security Related Motivations
Regional Dynamics: Proliferation literature sees security related motivations as 
important drivers of nuclear weapon acquisition. When it comes to latency, as a 
technological hedging option, regional dynamics provide significant motivations 
for Turkey. Iran, and its long running nuclear program, in particular is highly 
salient for Turkey. There are number of studies that foresee Turkish nuclear 
proliferation in the case of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon (Güney 2012). 
Although Iran’s nuclear program has been temporarily stopped by the agreement 
between the P5+1 and Iran, known as The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), Iran’s advancing nuclear infrastructure still remains a potential 
Table 1. Turkey’s Latency Motivations
Security Related Motivations Domestic Motivations Technological Motivations
- Regional Dynamics 
-  Weakening extended 
deterrence and assurance: 
NATO/U.S. and Western 
Alliances
- Energy related considerations
- Domestic political dynamics
- Technological imperatives
Source: Author
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trigger for a regional proliferation chain where other countries opt for similar 
capabilities (McFall 2017). Currently, Iran is the only country that is very close 
to being labeled as a latent nuclear power in the region. Saudi Arabia comes 
first among those who cannot afford the threat of a regional rival armed with 
(virtual) nuclear weapons. Turkey is also one of the aforementioned candidates 
for nuclear weapons within the nuclear community of experts. However, Turkey 
and Iran have managed to keep differences at the sub-strategic level by retaining 
deepening economic ties and opening state-to-state channels even though there 
are serious conflictual rivalry patterns, especially in Syria (Stein 2015). That has 
not changed in the current environment even though there are a number of 
geopolitical rivalries among them and even beyond. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) alliance shapes Ankara’s approach to security including 
the Iranian nuclear threat. Given the current diminishing level of trust between 
the United States and NATO, Turkey would be between a rock and a hard place 
in making the decision on nuclear latency, if not going for the full nuclear option. 
Given the low ebbs with the United States and other NATO allies, that possibility 
is indeed on the horizon. 
Besides the Iran issue, Turkey also has a number of hot spots and increasing 
security risks and volatilities in its immediate periphery. External threats to 
Turkey, for a long time, have stemmed from non-state violent arms groups and 
terror networks. Ongoing PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) terrorism and a proto-
Kurdish state which has emerged out of the chaos in neighboring countries are 
an existential threat to Turkey. Yet these types of threats do not require a nuclear 
deterrent as Turkey’s advanced conventional capacities are potent enough. 
Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has increased its development 
and procurement of advanced precision strike capabilities, many of which are 
homegrown. However, increasing threats on the menacing southern and eastern 
borders may force Turkey to take an alternative decision in the long-term. This is 
especially true when it comes to the increasing missile threat. Turkey first became 
truly concerned with the proliferation of ballistic missiles during the Iraq-Iran 
War in 1980s. Currently, all neighbors along the eastern and southern borders 
are known to have pursued militarization, acquisition of massive conventional 
weapons, proliferation of missiles, and even WMDs. Even though Israel is the 
only state that has not signed the NPT, Algeria, Sudan, and Israel have not signed 
the Biological Weapons Convention, and Egypt and Syria have thus far refused to 
sign the Chemical Weapons Convention. Iran is pushing ahead with its nuclear 
and missile programs. No state in the region is a formal member of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime, and many states in the region are known to have 
pursued nonconventional weapons in the past (Ulgen 2012). Moreover, not 
just states but also violent non-state actors armed with advanced weapons and 
missiles pose a great danger to Turkey. Turkey was under constant missile fire 
from ISIS for months, and is now under the threat of missiles from PKK/PYD 
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in Syrian territory (PYD is the Syrian affiliate of the PKK). This pushes Turkey 
towards advancement and domestic capability building, which also increase its 
technical latency in terms of strategic delivery systems. 
Russia may be the only country that threatens Turkey with nuclear 
retaliation. Russia has increased its nuclear and conventional capabilities with 
a sophisticated modernization program. Yet, Russian build-up historically 
and traditionally has not been aimed at Turkey. Furthermore, given Turkey’s 
dependence on Russia for energy and trade, Turkey has strong incentives to 
maintain positive relations with Russia.  However, since the annexation of Crimea, 
the balance of power has dramatically changed in the Black Sea. Changing 
security dynamics in the Black Sea area have become an important topic among 
Turkish security circles. With increasing tension between Russia and NATO, new 
Russian nuclear weapons, especially tactical and permanent deployments, will 
be more of a concern to Turkey in the near future. In the absence of the nuclear 
deterrence provided by NATO, Turkey would opt for nuclear hedging or for a 
minimal nuclear deterrence if it found itself on its own against Russia. 
Weakening Extended Deterrence and Assurance: The United States and NATO 
have long formed the cornerstone of Turkish security to a degree that it is an 
integral part of the security establishment. Enhancement of that deterrence 
is required in order to reassure Turkey in the quickly deteriorating security 
environment underlined above. However, recently Turkey has begun to view 
the United States (and some other NATO allies) as untrustworthy and the 
credibility of the extended deterrence provided by the United States and NATO is 
diminishing. 
The crisis in Syria has placed tremendous strain on U.S.-Turkey relations 
over the last several years. Given the uneasy situation at the strategic level and 
opposing views on priorities, Turkey believes U.S. resolve as it relates to the 
security of Turkey is at its lowest level since the Johnson Letter Incident in 1964. 
Especially, the U.S. decision to transfer heavy weapons to the Kurdish groups in 
Syria, who have clear ties to the PKK which is a designated terrorist organization 
by Turkey, created heavy strain. Moreover, the U.S. indifference to Fetullah 
Gulen, the mastermind behind the attempted coup on July 15, 2016 in Turkey, 
and refusal to take legal action against him and his activities have given rise to 
great anti-U.S. sentiment in Turkey. As result of these developments, the Turkish 
people perceive the United States to be the number one threat to Turkey instead 
of an ally (Hurriyet Daily News 2017). 
Turkey’s relations with other key NATO allies, such as Germany, has also 
drifted into the abyss since the coup-attempt and following purge in Turkey. The 
EU has been seen as a major proliferation constraint (Udum 2007), yet the EU-
Turkey relationship has been at an impasse for years with no sign of possible 
improvement. Turkey is also remarkably less enthusiastic about EU membership, 
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which was one of the incentives to perform reforms, in the recent years amid high 
tensions between the country and the bloc. 
From the deterrence perspective, the discussion on the removal of U.S. 
nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Base (Fitzpatrick 2016b; Gotev and Schalit 
2016; Lamothe 2016) will resonate in Ankara rather dauntingly.  In fact, these 
tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey have little military value or purpose as there 
is no permanent nuclear capable U.S. fighter wings stationed at the air base and 
Turkey has no authority or capability to use them alone. There is an assumption 
that if the weapons were removed, Turkey’s status in NATO would be negatively 
affected.5 The weapons are not only for deterrence but have a number of political 
implications and have come to symbolize the U.S. commitment to Turkey’s 
defense (Ulgen 2012, 12). Therefore, their political significance is vital and Iran’s 
nuclear program complicates the issue. A nuclear Iran could spark an arms race 
in the Middle East and bring about a “proliferation cascade,” which may cause 
Turkey to reconsider its nuclear options—especially if the United States pulls its 
nuclear weapons from Incirlik (Bell and Loehrke 2009). In the absence of nuclear 
deterrence, a nuclear capable Iran significantly affects Turkish proliferation 
policy and Turkey would probably take steps in pursuing more robust scientific 
expertise and nuclear infrastructure for nuclear hedging to balance Iran. 
Extended deterrence provided by the United States, NATO, and the EU as an 
institution still remain the most important proliferation constraints for Turkey. 
Disenchantment with the EU, eroding U.S. credibility, as well as the increasingly 
louder discussions on whether U.S. nuclear weapons should continue to be 
stationed in Turkey and calls to remove them are therefore possible proliferation 
pressures for military strategic planners as well as politicians. And these 
proliferation pressures may revitalize Turkish interest in nuclear latency. 
Domestic Motivations
Energy Related Motivations: The most important drivers of nuclear technology 
in the world and Turkey are energy related considerations. Turkey has the highest 
rate of growing energy demand among Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries over the last fifteen years while it has long 
been facing limited supplier options and highly volatile fossil fuel prices with a 
high import dependency rate. The country imports 98 percent of its natural gas 
and 93 percent of its oil, which costs well over $60 billion annually. Given the 
increasing cost of energy, there are increasing concerns about Turkey’s energy 
insecurity as the country grows. To reduce its energy import dependency, nuclear 
energy is one of the most stable and cost-effective alternatives for the country. 
Turkey pursues nuclear energy programs first and foremost because of a set of 
energy-related motivations. 
For Turkey, building nuclear power plants is economically rational in 
terms of both decreasing heavy reliance on fossil fuels and heavy reliance on a 
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few countries (Russia and Iran) for its substantial energy import. Turkey will 
probably produce at least around 10 to 16 percent of its electricity needs from 
nuclear power in the near future. To this end, Turkey has engaged in several 
nuclear power plant projects since the early 1960s. Recent economic and political 
changes have resulted in a so-called nuclear renaissance in Turkey since 2009, 
when decisive steps were taken to build nuclear power plants. For the first nuclear 
power plant project, Turkey has signed an agreement with Russia that states a 
subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned atomic power company Rosatom would build, 
own, and operate a nuclear power plant at the Akkuyu site.6 Compared to other 
suppliers, Russia offered a more generous proposal (Ulgen and Perkovich 2015). 
As a matter of fact, the agreement appears to be an economically advantageous 
deal for Turkey considering the prices and profits included (Ulgen et al. 2016). 
This power plant (consisting of four VVER-1200 reactors with a total capacity 
4.800 MW) is expected to be partly operational in 2023. The second power plant 
has been contracted to a Franco-Japanese consortium, yet the project’s start and 
finalization dates are not certain at the moment. A third power plant is also in the 
planning stages and is expected to be contracted to a Chinese company. 
Turkey is part of a growing movement among developing and developed 
states that are pursuing nuclear energy as a way to decrease carbon emissions 
while also decreasing reliance on unstable foreign energy suppliers. In the Middle 
East alone, thirteen countries without the same economical rationality as Turkey 
been pursuing a dormant nuclear agenda. Two prominent nuclear experts 
underlined that Turkey has valid economic arguments for developing the capacity 
to produce nuclear energy since the country has a huge current-account deficit 
due to the high portion of energy import and its electricity demand continues to 
grow at 5-6 percent per year (Ulgen and Perkovich 2015). 
Therefore, nuclear power has to be seen as an energy issue, and even as an 
energy security issue, rather than solely as a security issue let alone a problem of 
Table 2. Planned and Proposed Nuclear Power Reactors 
Site Type MWe Gross Start Construction Start Operations
Akkuyu 1 VVER-1200 1200 2018 2023
Akkuyu 2 VVER-1200 1200 2019 2023
Akkuyu 3 VVER-1200 1200 2020 2024
Akkuyu 4 VVER-1200 1200 2021 2025
Sinop 1-4 Atmea1 4x1120 - -
Igneada 1-2 AP1000x2 2x1250 - -
Igneada 3-4 CAP1400x2 2x1400 - -
Source: World Nuclear Association (2018)
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regime survival in the Turkish context (Udum 2010). 
Domestic Political Dynamics: The debate over nuclear energy in Turkey is 
robust and inexorably entwined with domestic politics. Different parts of society 
take part in the nuclear discussion for different reasons. Even though there is no 
scientific study on public opinion regarding nuclear energy, according to Udum 
(ibid.), a well-known Turkish expert on the nuclear issue, constituencies that 
support nuclear power in Turkey comprise very different parts of Turkish society 
including political parties, the business sector, and civil society groups consisting 
of unions and academics. However, the most important fact is that very few 
pundits loudly express support for a nuclear weapon capacity as a hedging 
strategy within security discourse. Yet, it is difficult to assess whether or not there 
is genuine support for nuclear latency among the Turkish public in general. One 
important point is also the fact that the media, both private and public, do not 
traditionally have a significant role in national security decisions. Civilian nuclear 
energy, however, is generally characterized as symbol of modernity and economic 
progress. Nuclear energy for many Turkish politicians, elites, and intellectuals is a 
defiant quest for modernity. 
Should Turkey decide for the nuclear latency option, the military’s support 
is necessary but not sufficient in the current environment. Another body who’s 
support would be required is the National Security Council, which has been 
under civilian control since 2008. Turkey also has substantial civilian entities 
with nuclear expertise many of which are directly controlled by the office of 
prime minister. However, these civilian bodies are now under full-presidential 
oversight since the office of prime minister has been abolished due to the recent 
constitutional changes. The Science and Technology Supreme Board, National 
Nuclear Technology Development Program, and Turkish Atomic Energy are 
some of these state entities. A nuclear decision would require active involvement 
of these bodies, and in Turkey these bodies are wholly civilian entities in terms 
of both human resources and budgetary oversight. In this sense, a military 
decision which could lead to an opaque proliferation would not be easy in the 
Turkish context. The Turkish military could play a decisive role in the past. Yet, 
in the current climate of Turkish politics, the president is the most probable 
candidate to make the decision to move towards nuclearization. That does not 
mean that he could make such a decision alone. Yet, compared to the past, 
the president has more power in making such a decision. Legally speaking, a 
nuclear weapons program would require the acquiescence of the Turkish General 
Assembly (TBMM) and the president’s consent, as well as cooperation from at 
least some of these civilian entities. Therefore, a latency decision has to be made 
through a consensual process; not all players are equally influential, yet none can 
individually control the outcome.
From a theoretical point of view, Solingen’s domestic political survival model 
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argues that leaders of internationalizing domestic coalitions have incentives to 
avoid the political, economic, reputational, and opportunity costs of acquiring 
nuclear weapons, while inward-oriented regimes are unsurprisingly more likely 
to pursue nuclear weapons not only from a political economy standpoint but also 
because such regimes typically embrace the kind of oppositional nationalism that 
casts nuclear weapons acquisition in a positive light (Solingen 2009). However, 
it is also true that more restrictive rule and nuclear weapons aspirations can 
undermine rather than support the development of civilian nuclear power as is 
often presumed in the literature (Jewell and Ates 2015). When it comes to Turkey, 
neither the current government under the AKP (Justice and Development Party) 
nor Turkey’s military favor inward-oriented political survival models. They 
have embraced economic and political liberalization. They face strong material 
disincentives to pursue nuclear weapons because their prosperity depends on 
Turkey’s continued good-citizen status. Turkey is therefore likely to continue 
to pursue prestige from multilateral interactions, constraining it from pursuing 
nuclear weapons. 
Technological Motivations
Technological Imperatives: In the literature, it is often acknowledged that 
the decision to acquire nuclear latency is driven by a combination of security 
motivations, domestic politics, and elements of technological determinism 
(Mehta and Whitlark 2016). Technological imperatives are a natural byproduct of 
technological capacity; that is, once a country has the ability to select the latency 
option it would choose to do so, and once a country is fully latent it would 
go for actual nuclear proliferation. For example, existing research on nuclear 
weapons proliferation has shown that a country’s level of economic or industrial 
development may serve as an important driver for acquiring nuclear weapons (Jo 
and Gartzke 2007). When it comes to Turkey, due to its current level of technical 
capability, latency is not an easily reachable option for the time being, let alone 
actual proliferation. As Mark Hibbs (2015) states: “If Turkey were to aim for a 
nuclear-weapons capability, it would have quite a long road to travel. I say that 
because there’s nothing on record—not in the open literature, not on file at the 
IAEA Department of Safeguards, and apparently not in current U.S. government 
intelligence dossiers—that documents any Turkish undeclared nuclear activities.” 
Therefore, the actual question concerning Turkey is how latent it could be rather 
than how latent is it. 
Turkey and Technical Nuclear Proliferation towards Latency: How 
Latent Could It Be?
A nuclear power program can be a stepping stone to or a cover-up for a nuclear 
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weapons program. Thus, any new nuclear energy program raises potential 
proliferation questions (Udum 2010). The Turkish case is no different. Yet, the 
most important point here is the fact that, if the all the construction projects 
are finalized as outlined, Turkey will be the first in the world to rely on foreign 
vendors to own and operate nuclear power plants.7 Departing from the fact 
that the nuclear fuel-cycle and nuclear waste management have not been 
clearly addressed in the agreements made between Turkey and the foreign 
vendors, some argue that Turkey has (secret) intentions to maintain the option 
to run the reactors with its own low enriched uranium (Rühle 2015), which is 
not illegitimate under the NPT and technically would open Turkey’s path to 
producing nuclear fissile materials. A 2014 report, based on estimates by the 
German intelligence service, claimed that Turkey was adopting the Iranian 
model—a civilian nuclear program on the surface with a military program 
underneath (ibid.). Turkey has not ruled out the option of indigenous uranium 
enrichment capacity, which is a given right under the NPT. However, Turkey is 
not Iran, nor North Korea, and should not be treated as such. Turkey is a well-
behaved member of the NPT regime with a top-ranked non-proliferation record 
due to its long-standing compliance with NPT requirements as recorded by the 
main watchdog IAEA (Ulgen 2012). Indeed, then Turkish Energy Minister Taner 
Yıldız ruled out the claims that Turkey secretly opted for uranium enrichment 
(Hürriyet Daily News 2014). Later, Turkey issued a joint statement with eleven 
other countries to eliminate HEU and its replacement (Haaretz 2014). These 
are indicators that Ankara has been actively seeking to maintain its clean 
nonproliferation record. Moreover, since 2012, Turkey has received the IAEA’s 
so-called “broader conclusion” designation, reiterating its clean nonproliferation 
record.  
Indeed, when we look at the Turkish regulations on nuclear waste 
management and nuclear fuel procurement, these issues may be left for further 
negotiations due to attached financial costs, yet it is explicitly stated that these 
issues are the responsibility of the foreign operating companies. The agreement 
made with Rosatom provides for further cooperation between Russia and Turkey 
in other areas of the nuclear fuel cycle including the treatment of used nuclear 
fuel and radioactive waste, decommissioning, and the possible construction 
of a Turkish nuclear fuel fabrication plant. Yet, the finalized agreement and 
Russian code of conduct on the fuel cycle and nuclear power plant establishment 
clearly states that the Russian side is the owner of the nuclear fuel while 
Turkey has almost no authority in the usage of the spent fuel (Pekar 2014, 2). 
For the projected power plant to be located at Sinop, Turkey has searched for 
cooperation in other areas of the nuclear fuel cycle including the treatment of 
used nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, which also cast doubts about Turkey’s 
long-term intentions. For this project, the procedure for the nuclear fuel and 
waste management is not clear, yet it is highly anticipated that the French side 
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would bear the responsibility for both fuel and waste management since it is 
the only party with that particular capability. This is important because, under 
the Build, Operate, and Own (BOO) financing and operating model, “if Turkey 
decided to use these reactors to proliferate, it would first have to kick out the 
foreign operator and then separate the foreign-owned spent fuel stored on 
site, before fashioning a crude implosion bomb, which is not feasible” (Stein 
2015). Therefore, it is clear that Turkey will not be able to have any enrichment 
activities in the short- and medium-term at its projected nuclear power plants. 
Moreover, the biggest deficiency in nuclear development is in human resources 
as the country still lacks indigenous expertise on the issue of nuclear energy. The 
ongoing construction and cooperation agreements will boost Turkish human 
resources in nuclear expertise, yet Turkey may also face difficulties developing a 
singular and focused nuclear energy industry, largely because financing concerns 
have prompted the government to make disparate decisions about reactors. Thus, 
Turkish technicians trained as part of the program to operate Akkuyu will not 
have transferable skills for the Sinop plant and vice versa. (Stein 2016). Turkey 
also has a modest level of uranium deposits. However, the raw material is not a 
problem for any amount of nuclear activity in Turkey. Overall, Turkey will not 
be able to reach genuine nuclear latency due to the nature of the ongoing nuclear 
power plant projects even if it has several industrial scale civilian nuclear reactors.
Why, then, has Turkey deliberately left open an indigenous enrichment 
option? Here, it should be noted that Turkey profoundly emphasizes the right 
to enrichment under the NPT. The Turkish policy regarding Iran sanctions is a 
microcosm for Turkish nuclear diplomacy. Turkey has accepted and implemented 
the multilateral sanction regime of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 
while has refusing to obey by the American and European sanctions not just 
because they were harmful to its economy but also because the West’s demand 
that Iran halt enrichment as a clear violation of Iran’s right under the NPT to 
pursue nuclear activities (Ulgen 2012, 7). Under Article IV of the NPT, every 
signatory has the right to pursue peaceful nuclear activities and nuclear supplier 
countries are obligated to facilitate the exchange of nuclear technology and 
materials. In recent years, the Turkish interpretation of Article IV has been a 
source of friction between Turkey and some of its Western allies, especially 
when it comes to international efforts to limit nuclear aspirant countries from 
accessing enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Turkish official views of 
these efforts as a threat to Turkey’s own nuclear ambitions and have challenged 
proposals designed to make it harder for a state to access nuclear technologies 
(ibid., 14). Turkey’s nuclear diplomacy is influenced strongly by the fact that it 
is a non-nuclear weapons state seeking to develop an indigenous nuclear energy 
program. Ankara has positioned itself as a champion of nonproliferation, while 
maintaining a strict interpretation of Article IV of the NPT (Ulgen 2011, 145). 
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Conclusion
From a proliferation standpoint, enrichment technologies for reactors can be 
applied to nuclear weapon development. That is, if a country has the ability 
to enrich uranium to reactor level (low-level enrichment) then that country 
can level up its uranium stockpile to weapons grade (high-level enrichment) 
within a relatively small amount of time, which gives a country latency from 
a technical point of view. The key point here is whether the country that has 
reprocessing capabilities obeys the rules of the international nonproliferation 
regime. Departing from this fact, Turkey has not announced any plans to 
pursue enrichment or reprocessing; on the contrary, by the nature of its existing 
operation and finance model for its projected power plants and by the nature 
of its commitment to the nonproliferation regime, it has shown good practices. 
Turkey has reiterated that uranium enrichment is a future long-term option 
should Turkey build a lot of nuclear power reactors, but is not currently being 
pursued (Hibbs 2015). Moreover, nuclear fuel has always been available on the 
international market for small and medium sized nuclear programs. Indigenous 
production is not economical unless there is intent for industrial scale enrichment 
(Fitzpatrick 2014). In this sense, there are at least two important points that can 
be drawn from the assessments given in this article: (1) Turkey will not have 
industrial-scale enrichment or reprocessing capabilities in the short- or medium-
term; and (2) as long as Turkey remains a well-behaved member of the non-
proliferation community and takes care to protect its clear record, suspicion of 
“bad intentions” is ill-placed. Such changes are only possible if Turkey’s domestic 
political and external security environment change dramatically. 
However, Turkey’s recent interest and efforts to develop nuclear energy 
production along with its indigenous capabilities are sometimes characterized 
as the first step towards nuclear latency (Stein 2015). Current Turkish civilian 
energy plans are completely related to the economic needs of the country. Turkey 
does not presently have the necessary infrastructure to produce fissile materials 
for a nuclear weapon, nor it does possess the relevant infrastructure to mine 
uranium, enrich uranium, or reprocess spent fuel (Ulgen 2012, 21). It will not be 
capable of these tasks in the near and medium future. Almost all of its indigenous 
capabilities, such as short- and medium-range missiles, missile defense, small 
space program, are driven by its security needs. Therefore, all things considered, 
Turkey’s latency in the technical area will increase, yet that increase cannot be 
thought of as potent enough to be considered a latent nuclear weapons program 
in the short-term without a serious change in international and domestic politics. 
An economically rational, politically inclusive, and technically transparent 
peaceful pursuit of nuclear energy under the eye of a strong and verifiable 
international watchdog agency and the international non-proliferation 
community is not a threat. Although a latent nuclear capability may arise through 
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a domestic nuclear energy program, Turkey is unlikely to take advantage of that 
under the current internal and external political environment. 
Notes
1. Accroding to Meyer (1984, 9-10), possible dependent variables in the proliferation 
field are: (1) the development of a latent nuclear weapons capacity, whether this is 
intentional or as an unintented byproduct of other choices; (2) the conscious “capability 
decision” to generate a certain level of nuclear weapons breakout capacity; and (3) the 
actual acquisition of a functional arsenal.
2. While Meyer measured indigenous uranium sources, Stoll assumed that all states 
had access to nuclear materials, arguing that they were now freely available on the global 
market. See Sagan (2010, 85).
3. For a good example, see Mehta and Whitlark (2016).
4.  Being a member of the Nuclear Supplier Group does not necessarily imply a latency 
metric itself.  Nevertheless, it points to a certain accrual of a standard set of nuclear 
technology capabilities.
5. For a counter argument, see Kibaroglu (2011).
6.  As tension rose after a Russian jet was downed by Turkey, the project was reportedly 
terminated. Yet, a broad rapprochement has been achieved, and construction has officially 
started. However, this brief case shows that Turkey’s nuclear future is politically unstable 
given the turbulent relations of the country.
7.  This is a direct result of the “Build, Operate, and Own” financing model that Turkey 
increasingly relies on for many other big infrastructure projects as well. This financing 
model requires that the nuclear vendor provide financing for the construction of the 
reactor and operates it for the life of the power plant in return for the Turkish state-
owned electricity utility guaranteeing a purchase price for an agreed amount of electricity 
produced at the plant. If it goes well, it would be replicated in other countries too.
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